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Drug smuggling and vice along the US-Mexico and US-Canada borders were 
topics of much public debate during the period following World War II. This 
article examines the ways in which media debates, pop culture images, and 
federal enforcement policies towards transnational drug smuggling overlapped 
in the North American borderlands. In both Canada and the United States, 
public discourse and federal policy blamed drug trafficking on racial outsiders 
and Communists, framing border cities as the first line of contact between heroic 
enforcement officers and dangerous transnational criminals. Blaming the “drug 
problem” on dangerous others, though, sometimes hampered cross-border 
alliances between local officials, making it difficult to enforce anti-drug policies 
across national lines. Ultimately, by analysing the US-Mexico and US-Canadian 
borders in relation to one another, we gain new insight into the ideologies that 
united North American drug policies in the postwar years, as well as the ways in 
which modern perceptions of “bordertowns” were created by Cold War anxieties 
about transnational crime and vice.
La contrebande de stupéfiants et la criminalité le long des frontières entre le 
Mexique, les États-Unis et le Canada ont fait couler beaucoup d’encre après la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le présent article examine les recoupements au niveau 
des débats dans les médias, des images populaires et des politiques fédérales 
visant à contrer le trafic de drogues transnational dans les zones frontalières 
nord-américaines. Au Canada comme aux États-Unis, l’opinion publique tout 
autant que les politiques fédérales ont blâmé les étrangers et les communistes 
pour le trafic de stupéfiants et transformé les villes frontalières en foyers de 
rencontre entre héroïques agents d’exécution de la loi et redoutables criminels 
transnationaux. Or, le fait de rejeter le « problème de la drogue » sur l’étranger 
dangereux a parfois nui aux alliances transfrontalières entre fonctionnaires 
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locaux, compliquant du coup l’application des politiques antidrogues de part et 
d’autre de la frontière. À terme, l’analyse des régions frontalières apporte un 
éclairage nouveau sur les idéologies communes des politiques antidrogues en 
Amérique du Nord dans les années d’après-guerre, ainsi que sur l’apparition 
des perceptions modernes à l’égard des villes frontalières nées des craintes 
concernant la criminalité transnationale en pleine guerre froide.
ON JANUARY 5, 1952 a front-page Washington Post article reported on a nation-
wide crackdown on narcotics trafficking in the United States designed to put at 
least 500 peddlers behind bars in what was termed “the greatest criminal roundup 
in the Nation’s history.” “The raids stretched from Canada to Mexico,” the paper 
reported, and included border cities like Buffalo, New York—a “key gateway” 
to the drug market in Canada—as well “as a scattering of cities in Texas and 
New Mexico near the southern border.” In this massive federal raid, American 
authorities attempted to “break the backbone” of the illegal drug trade that, by 
the early postwar period, stretched across North American borders and beyond. 
While the scope of this investigation was exceptional, its goals and the publicity 
it received were not. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, national publications 
in the United States and Canada regularly printed stories about international 
drug smuggling rings that used the shared border as a way to sneak illegal drugs 
into the country. The porousness of the national line, and the gall of the criminal 
underworld that congregated around it, led Americans and Canadians to worry 
that these “swashbuckling criminals” were increasingly making life difficult for 
federal authorities and dangerous for law-abiding citizens.1
 As the Washington Post article suggests, during the late 1940s and 1950s, the 
issues of illegal drug smuggling and crime along the US-Canada and US-Mexico 
borders were hotly debated in the public arena. By examining media and pop 
culture narratives on the issue of drug trafficking, as well as federal investigations 
into the “drug problem” in the United States and Canada, this article explores 
the cultural meanings of anti-drug discourses in the postwar environment. In 
publications ranging from nationally circulated papers like the New York Times 
and the Globe and Mail to local papers like the Windsor Daily Star and the 
Arizona Republic, Canadians and Americans regularly read about drug traffickers 
and crime syndicates bringing large quantities of narcotics into North America. 
Blaming the smuggling problem on the rise of organized crime and Communist 
conspiracies from abroad, these stories presented an image of racial and ethnic 
others subverting national laws and sneaking across North American borders. 
Within this formulation, bordertowns along the US-Canada and US-Mexico 
borders emerged as the front lines in the fight between heroic federal officials 
and nefarious villains. Contemporary media and pop culture images portrayed 
bordertowns as vice towns, where the forces of good and evil collided and where 
otherwise good citizens came into daily contact with dangerous outsiders.
1 “Nation-Wide War on Dope Launched by Authorities,” The Washington Post, January 5, 1952, p. 1.
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 If the domestic drug problem was a result of global criminals and porous 
borders, Americans and Canadians began to wonder what their governments were 
doing to protect citizens. In 1955, the American and Canadian federal governments 
took up this question when both formed special senate committees to investigate 
the drug problem.2 These highly publicized investigations served to reinforce 
popular perceptions that the drug problem was largely caused by dangerous 
outsiders. Through their testimonies before committees, officials like the heads 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), and immigration and customs departments reaffirmed the image of the 
heroic federal official fighting racial and ethnic others at each nation’s boundaries. 
By focusing on a shared prohibitionist ideology, federal officials also worked 
hard to demonstrate that they were in fact in control of the drug problem and 
were effectively working together with neighbouring nations to enforce stringent 
drug policies. At a time when the Canadian and American governments were 
attempting to project a unified front in the fight against Communism and other 
subversive forces, fighting vice networks was about more than simply eliminating 
a particular illegal activity.3 It was also a way for the federal governments to enact 
what Kenneth Meier terms “morality politics,” in which federal officials asserted 
themselves as the proper authorities to define productive citizenship and protect 
their nations’ boundaries against dangerous interlopers.4
 Yet a closer look at the complex representations of bordertowns and border 
enforcement in the senate committee debates also highlights the contradictions 
inherent in attempting to control spaces that operate simultaneously as barriers 
and as connecting points. While the simplistic dualism of “heroes” and “villains” 
sometimes enabled federal enforcement officials in the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico to work together to fight an identifiable “other” (such as a member of the 
Mafia importing heroin across national lines), it also often led local enforcement 
officers to blame the trafficking problem on the lax policies of their neighbours. 
American customs and border agents publicly accused the Mexican government 
of failing to stop the flow of drugs out of Mexico, while Canadian law enforcement 
officers likewise complained about the influx of drugs from their American 
neighbours to the south. Despite lofty attempts to present a unified prohibitionist 
front in the fight against cross-border smuggling and crime at the federal level, 
then, the realities of life in border cities often blurred the line between “good 
guys” and “bad guys” that was so central to postwar anti-vice rhetoric. Ultimately, 
the exclusive definitions of citizenship that allowed the public and government 
officials to blame vice and illicit cross-border activities on dangerous “others” 
2 For further discussion of the senate committees, see Nancy Campbell, Using Women: Gender, Drug Policy, 
and Social Justice (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 112-136; Clayton Mosher, “The Legal Response to 
Narcotic Drugs in Five Ontario Cities, 1908-1961” (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1992); Kyle 
Grayson, Chasing Dragons: Security, Identity, and Illicit Drugs in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2008), pp. 143-146.
3 On US-Canada cooperation in the postwar years, see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada 
and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), especially chap. 7, 
“Canada in the New American Empire, 1947-1960,” pp. 184-213.
4 Kenneth Meier, The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 
p.  4.
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also at times undermined the effectiveness of nation-building projects, diplomacy, 
and border enforcement in the postwar years.
Public Concerns: Setting the Context for the 1955 Senate Committees
While anti-drug discourses were not unique to the postwar period and indeed have 
a long genealogy in North American history, the postwar environment shaped 
public perceptions of illegal drugs and drug users in key ways. Growing fears 
over two international conspiracies—the Mafia and Communism—helped to 
transform national anti-drug narratives into global struggles against much larger 
sinister forces. This transformation was bolstered by high-ranking federal officials 
who stressed the need to remain vigilant against the infiltration of these menacing 
forces into North American society. Organizations like the FBN and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under the direction of Harry Anslinger and Herbert 
Hoover respectively, misleadingly depicted both the Mafia and Communism 
as coherent and centralized international conspiracies, arguing that they were 
the two most dangerous threats facing North American society.5 Their claims 
were reinforced by several government investigations into the growing power 
of organized crime and its negative effects on North American life.6 The most 
publicized hearing was the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized 
Crime, or the Kefauver Committee as its came to be known. These televised 
hearings, which took place over the course of 1950, were watched by millions of 
Americans and became a useful tool in mobilizing the public against organized 
crime.7 The hearings portrayed figures like New York’s Charles “Lucky” Luciano 
and Detroit’s Joseph Zerilli, in contrast to the street thugs of the Prohibition Era, 
as sophisticated individuals whose tactics had evolved to allow them to blend in 
with corporate leaders and use legitimate businesses and unions as fronts for their 
illegal activities.8
 Newspapers, magazines, films, and television shows, drawing on “evidence” 
provided by law enforcement officials and politicians, created sensational stories 
about the connection between the illegal drug trade and transnational syndicates. 
Anslinger and other FBN agents collaborated with journalists who printed stories 
based solely on the information they received from the enforcement officers. They 
regularly leaked stories about their agents standing bravely against the Mafia and 
the People’s Republic of China, suggesting that the objective of both was to speed 
up the moral degeneration of the American people through the spread of drug 
5 Michael Woodiwiss, Organized Crime and American Power: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001), p. 248; Lee Bernstein, The Greatest Menace: Organized Crime in Cold War America 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), p. 9.
6 Between 1945 and 1980, there were at least five presidential and congressional commissions formed in 
the United States and at least six provincial or federal commissions in Canada that studied the problem 
of organized crime. See Stephen Schneider, Iced: The Story of Organized Crime in Canada (Mississauga, 
ON: John Wiley and Sons, 200), p. 227.
7 Woodiwiss, Organized Crime, p. 244. See also William Howard Moore, The Kefauver Committee and the 
Politics of Crime, 1950-1952 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).
8 Lee Bernstein, “What Did Apalachin Prove: Mafia Skepticism in Cold War Politics and Culture,” Trends 
in Organized Crime, vol. 10, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 10-11.
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addiction.9 Similarly, national publications in Canada printed stories of large-scale 
syndicates trafficking dope across the national border and subsequently harming 
thousands of Canadian citizens. “The individual racketeer has gone,” one 1954 
Maclean’s Magazine article reported, “and the traffic is controlled today by 
‘syndicates’ headed by [men who are] clever, suave, outwardly well-mannered, 
but inwardly as vicious and dangerous as the old-time gangster.”10
 Widely circulated media representations of the Italian mobster shaped public 
perceptions of the clever and cunning, yet extremely dangerous drug trafficker. 
One article, written by investigative reporter Drew Pearson in 1950 and reprinted 
in newspapers across the country, explained to the American public, “A total of 
50 men control most of the big rackets in the United States. All are members of 
the mysterious Mafia, and all but one are either Italian-born or of Italo-American 
descent.... Like a plate of spaghetti the connections of the Mafia members are 
tangled and twined together.”11 Similarly, a Chicago Defender article provided 
a brief history of the organization, describing its transition over time from a 
group of Sicilians forming an underground economy in the eighteenth century 
to a sophisticated organization that used violence and intimidation to infiltrate 
legitimate businesses and unions across North America. According to the article, 
ethnicity and blood lines were key, with pedigree “being handed down from father 
to son in the strict baronial manner.” “Essentially,” the Mafia was “just one big 
law-breaking family.”12 Contemporary reports likewise noted that this violent, 
patriarchal “family” controlled the narcotics traffic in North America by using 
lower-level peddlers to do the actual work of moving the illegal products. The 
higher-ups rarely got their hands dirty, instead relying on a series of mid-level 
dealers who pushed drugs in designated urban neighbourhoods, especially among 
racially segregated African American and Latino communities.13 As a result, 
federal officials had to use increasingly sophisticated tactics to pin narcotics, 
racketeering, or prostitution charges on them.
 The danger of the white ethnic mobster could only be matched by that 
presented by Chinese Communists, who—according to the media—trafficked 
dope into North American cities as part of an agenda designed to undermine the 
moral and physical health of citizens. The association between racial “others” and 
illicit drug use was not new to the postwar period; indeed, anti-drug movements 
had a long tradition of blaming the rise in drug addiction on particular racial or 
ethnic groups, often in the service of larger political agendas.14 This long history 
9 Woodiwiss, Organized Crime, pp. 244-245.
10 Alan Phillips, “The Case of the Drug Peddling Priest,” Maclean’s Magazine, August 1, 1954, p. 15.
11 Drew Pearson, “Fifty Members of the Mafia Control Big Rackets in United States,” St. Petersburg Times, 
October 10, 1950, p. 6. For reprints of the article, see “The Merry-Go Round,” The Palm Beach Post, 
October 10, 1950, p. 4; “Mafia Hold in US Bared,” The Tuscaloosa News, October 10, 1950, p. 3; “The 
Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Spokane Daily Chronicle, October 10, 1950; “Drew Pearson’s Washington 
Merry-Go-Round,” Warsaw Times-Union, October 10, 1950, p. 4.
12 “Says Mafia is Just One Big Family,” The Chicago Defender, July 19, 1958, p. 11.
13 Rufus Schatzberg and Robert J. Kelly, African American Organized Crime: A Social History (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1996), p. 108.
14 On race in early anti-drug campaigns, see Catherine Carstairs, Jailed for Possession: Illegal Drug Use, 
Regulation, and Power in Canada, 1920-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 17; David 
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of associating men of Chinese descent with opium use and other forms of vice in 
fact lent credence to the argument that Chinatowns were hotbeds of both drug use 
and Communist subversion in the postwar years.15 One Spokane Daily Chronicle 
article, for example, told the story of Pon Wai, a “smiling 64-year-old operator 
of the Fragrant Flower Garden shop in San Francisco’s Chinatown,” who “was 
peddling the white death called heroin.” The article explained that “day after day” 
the FBN had watched the florist, whom they suspected of drug trafficking, in an 
effort to ascertain how he was moving his illegal products. When a search of one 
of Pon Wai’s messengers revealed that he was smuggling “pure heroin” in green 
capsules attached to the stems of roses, the FBN agents finally had the evidence 
needed to arrest the florist and eight of his messengers on smuggling charges.16 
Similarly, a Saskatoon Star-Phoenix report described a bust of a smuggling ring 
in Vancouver’s Chinatown that uncovered a sophisticated network of individuals 
illegally bringing jade, diamonds, and opium into Canada from China. “In 
Market Alley, a dingy section of Vancouver’s Chinatown, with its rabbit-warren 
dwellings,” the article explained, “law enforcement agencies swooped down 
to uncover the existence of the ring after months of intensive investigations. 
The officers had to battle their way down the alley, finally overpowering four 
Chinese armed with meat cleavers who guarded a house doorway, leading to the 
Vancouver headquarters of the ring.”17 In these media narratives, federal agents 
emerged victorious over smugglers who used sophisticated and violent tactics to 
evade arrest.
 As the power of these global drug networks increased, postwar media narratives 
began to report on cities along the US-Canada and US-Mexico borders, framing 
them as the first sites of contact between transnational smugglers and vulnerable 
citizens. In the United States, national discussions about bordertowns tended to 
centre on Mexico, due in part to the growing amount of heroin and marijuana 
being imported from that country.18 Yet images of Mexican bordertowns were 
also rooted in a longer history in which Americans perceived the border as a 
racialized space that enabled criminality and violence. As Thomas Bender argues, 
the notion of bandidos and fugitives crossing the national line has been central to 
American perceptions of Mexico since at least the mid-nineteenth century.19 In the 
postwar years, public panics over illegal immigration likewise continued to fuel 
American perceptions that the US-Mexico border enabled lawlessness. Large-
scale immigration enforcement efforts, most significantly “Operation Wetback” 
in 1954, were highly publicized and had the effect of bolstering perceptions that 
Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotics Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
p. 3-4; Michael M Cohen, “Jim Crow’s Drug War: Race, Coca Cola, and the Southern Origins of Drug 
Prohibition,” Southern Cultures, vol. 12, no. 3 (2006), pp. 55-79.
15 “US Agents Smash Big Narcotics Ring,” New York Times, April 6, 1954, p. 26.
16 “San Francisco Agents Seize Narcotics from China,” Spokane Daily Chronicle, December 6, 1955, p. 9.
17 “Vancouver Police Break Up Canada-Wide Lottery, Smuggling, Dope Ring in Chinatown,” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix, June 22, 1946, p. 23.
18 Erick Schneider, Smack: Heroin and the American City (Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008), p. 77.
19 Thomas Bender, Run for the Border: Vice and Virtue in US-Mexico Border Crossings (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012). See especially chap. 1, “El Fugitivo,” pp. 11-26.
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countless illegal immigrants were pouring across the border on a daily basis.20 
Newspapers often explicitly linked the “illegal Mexican aliens” with vice problems 
in American cities. As one report explained, “Because these people live outside 
the law ... they have become victims of lawless elements in Southern California 
where dope and prostitution rings are causing serious local problems.”21
 American newspapers regularly described Mexican bordertowns as lawless 
places whose location next to large American markets enabled extensive vice 
industries to flourish. One Milwaukee Sentinel article described Baja California 
as “the gate to hell.” The article explained that the city’s “gaudy night clubs 
and half hidden dives attract Americans in droves. Tourist dollars spent on lurid 
pastimes—and on bullfights and horse and dog racing—provide the border 
population with just about its only income.” In a city with only 100,000 residents, 
the article maintained, there were as many as 8,000 prostitutes. “Their customers 
were Americans—‘who come here every time they need drugs, easy women, or to 
satisfy whatever insane desire they may have.’”22 The ease with which Americans 
could travel back and forth between American cities and Mexican bordertowns 
was central to this problem. As a Los Angeles Times article explained, many 
Americans were “only a hop, skip, and a fix away from pushers in [towns like] 
Tijuana.”23
 The notion of the wide-open bordertown likewise shaped public perceptions 
of cities along the northern border. A description of Windsor, Ontario, painted the 
city as a gateway to hell, where even “the devil himself lack[ed] the persistency, 
defiance, and outright gall of bordello and bootleg operators” who profited from 
their position along the national line. In these narratives, northern bordertowns 
like Windsor, Niagara Falls, Buffalo, Toronto, and Detroit also functioned as fluid 
spaces that united the central tropes of the postwar drug panic—race, mobility, 
and the power of organized syndicates. As one Maclean’s Magazine article 
explained to its readers, the headquarters of the “underworld lords” in Canada 
was “said to be in Toronto, hooked up with supply lines passing from Mexico 
through New York and Minneapolis. In boom years, their transactions have run 
20 Juan Ramon Garcia, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 
1954 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980); Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra: A History of the US Border 
Patrol (Berkley: University of California Press, 2010); Ronald Mize, Consuming Mexican Labor: From 
the Bracero Program to Nafta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Don Mitchell, They Saved the 
Crops: Labor, Landscape, and the Struggle Over Industrial Farming in Bracero-Era California (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2012).
21 “Ike Endorses Strong Policy on ‘Wetbacks’,” Oxnard Press-Courier, August 18, 1953, p . 4.
22 “Baja California Offers Sun, Fun,” Milwaukee Sentinel, November 24, 1958, p. 8. See also “Fictional 
Picture of Mexico as Crime Sanctuary False—Unless You’re Mexican,” Ocala Star-Banner, May 1, 1955, 
p. 3.
23 Gene Sherman, “Border Dope Traffic Swells,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1951, p. 1. For additional 
reports on cross-border trafficking between the United States and Mexico, see also “Narcotics Smugglers 
Out of Control,” Oxnard Press-Courier, April 20, 1954, p. 2; “Opium Pours Across Rio Grande,” The 
Washington Post, February 29, 1948, p. B5; “Narcotics Running From Mexico Rises,” New York Times, 
March 1, 1953, p. 13; “‘Wetbacks’ Cross at Two a Minute: Linked to Narcotic Trade,” New York Times, 
April 16, 1953, p. 11; “Mexico Denies Aiding Illicit Drug Traffic,” New York Times, May 15, 1953, p. 10; 
Drew Pearson, “Sen. Daniel’s Inquiry Into Narcotics Praised,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 
December 20, 1955, p. 31; “Addict Gets 15-25 Years, 1 Cent Fine,” Arizona Republic, November 3, 1955, 
p. 1.
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in the millions.”24 Papers regularly reported coordinated anti-drug efforts between 
American and Canadian officials, such as the 1959 sting that netted criminals 
from Montreal to New York and constituted the “biggest criminal narcotics case 
in Canadian history.”25 Others focused on small-scale smugglers who attempted 
to sneak by customs officials with smaller quantities of illegal drugs. Such was 
the case of Italian-Canadian Giuseppe Indelicato of Windsor, who tried to bring 
heroin across the Detroit-Windsor border by claiming it was cake frosting. In this 
instance, the seemingly innocent cross-border tourist actually turned out to be 
carrying over $300,000 worth of heroin.26
 Contemporary publications also stressed the interconnected nature of the drug 
trade between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, a development aided by the 
sophisticated organization of crime syndicates and the porousness of the national 
lines. These stories explained that nefarious traffickers often used the legal divide 
that separated border cities as a way to evade arrest. As one South Carolina 
newspaper warned, “Good Neighbor Canada will wake up any day [now] with 
as hard a headache as ours, over a national dope and crime scandal.” Claiming 
that cities across Canada were seeing a rise in drug use, especially among young 
people, the author stated that the problem was caused by the extensive smuggling 
networks that successfully brought heroin into Canada from either Mexico or 
the “Orient.” “The reason is,” the article explained, “the executive (mobster 
controlled) work of the Canadian underworld is done in Detroit and Buffalo, which 
are beyond the jurisdiction of the Mounties and other law enforcement agencies 
north of the border. And the parallel executive affairs for much of Buffalo, Detroit, 
and other nefarious traffic are headquartered in Canada, beyond the jurisdiction 
of the US Federal and other policing.” Traffickers “shrewdly operated in this 
fashion,” according to the author, “so that books, witnesses, collateral data, etc. 
can’t be subpoenaed on either side of the line.27 In this way, sophisticated drug 
networks used the legal divides separating the cities along the borders as a way 
to evade detection and arrest, subsequently opening up a relatively free flow of 
illegal goods across North America and beyond.
 By the late 1940s, accounts of vice and crime along the US-Canada and US-
Mexico borders also emerged in popular forms of entertainment, including films 
and television shows. Like larger media narratives, films presented the issue 
of drug smuggling as a battle between heroic male officers and nefarious drug 
traffickers, wherein the former struggled to protect innocent citizens (usually 
white female protagonists) from the latter. The 1949 film Johnny Stool Pigeon 
follows the story of FBN agent George Morton and convicted felon Johnny Evans 
as they go undercover to expose a heroin smuggling ring. The unlikely duo track 
the smugglers from San Francisco north across the Canadian border to Vancouver, 
then back south across the Mexican border to Nogales. By contrasting the cold 
24 Robert Francis, “Hopheads,” Maclean’s Magazine, February 15, 1947, p. 50.
25 “Big Narcotics Haul Made in Montreal,” New York Times, July 10, 1959, p. 8; See also “RCMP Reviews 
Careers of Canada’s Crime Kings,” Winnipeg Free Press, January 6, 1955, p. 22.
26 “Big Haul of Heroin Seized on Traveler,” New York Times, February 10, 1956, p. 44.
27 “What Some Guys Do for Publicity” Jack Lait (Herald-Journal Sept. 12, 1951 p. 6)
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northern frontier city of Vancouver with the rugged, wide-open spaces of Tucson 
and Nogales, the film depicts the expansive transnational networks through which 
smugglers operated. The white-ethnic traffickers in Vancouver work in tandem with 
the Mexican smugglers in Arizona, and both use seemingly legitimate nightclubs, 
tourist resorts, and import/export businesses to hide their shady transactions. 
Ultimately, though, these operations are no match for the “skill, intelligence, and 
courage” displayed by narcotics and customs officers. In the end, the officers 
succeed in foiling the smugglers’ plans to kill Agent Morton in Nogales and 
arrest them before they can flee their Tucson hideout. The final narration assures 
audiences, “Within a matter of hours the greatest international narcotics ring since 
the war was stopped cold before it ever got started. In simultaneous raids Martinez 
and his gang were rounded up by Mexican authorities, and 1700 miles away in 
Vancouver, British Colombia, the McCannis mob was taken into custody.”28 
Johnny Stool Pigeon thus simultaneously portrays the very real dangers posed by 
transnational drug smugglers while reinforcing the power and moral authority of 
federal officers, who in the end are able to protect the North American public from 
the wiles of these shady individuals.
 Similarly, Orson Welles’s 1959 film Touch of Evil begins with the famous shot 
of its main characters Mike and Susan Vargas crossing the border from Mexico into 
the United States. The Mexican side is portrayed as a seedy, yet bustling border city, 
replete with signs reading “Girls, Girls, Girls,” brothels run by old-time madams, 
and saloons full of drunken Americans. Early in the film, Vargas explains to his 
wife that the lawlessness she is witnessing in the Mexican bordertown is a result 
of its position along the national line, and not indicative of the rest of the country. 
As he reminds her, “This isn’t the real Mexico. You know that. All border towns 
bring out the worst in a country.” Yet the film also reinforces racial stereotypes that 
contrast the cunning and evil Mexican criminals with the innocent, white female 
protagonist. Several characters are central to cultural stereotypes of postwar 
bordertowns: virile and shady Mexican gangsters, American tourists enjoying the 
vice districts, and upstanding enforcement authorities. Much like contemporary 
media reports, Touch of Evil and Johnny Stool Pigeon portray bordertowns as 
spaces that enable lawlessness and vice and emphasize the mobility of dangerous 
transnational criminals who attempt to elude federal authorities by sneaking across 
national boundary lines. Federal agents emerge as the heroes, while the Mexican 
gangsters are portrayed as cunning and devious members of expansive organized 
syndicates.29
 Two television shows likewise capitalized on, and helped to perpetuate, North 
Americans’ fascination with cross-border crime in the postwar years. In 1959, 
CBS released a series called Border Patrol. As the name suggests, it follows the 
exploits of a fictitious deputy chief of the Border Patrol, Don Jagger, as he crosses 
between the US-Mexico and US-Canada borders in search of dope dealers, illegal 
28 Johnny Stool Pigeon, DVD, directed by William Castle, Universal International Pictures, Universal City, 
CA, 1949.
29 Touch of Evil, DVD, directed by Orson Welles, Universal International Pictures, Universal City, CA, 1959.
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immigrants, gun runners, and various other criminals.30 The show, which only 
aired for one season, was overshadowed by The Untouchables, an immensely 
popular TV series that also debuted that year. Set in Prohibition-era Chicago, it 
follows Special Agent Elliot Ness and his investigative team as they attempt to 
fight organized crime and vice. Episodes like “The Canada Run,” “Mexican Stake 
Out,” and “The White Slavers” brought viewers into the worlds of dangerous 
criminals who ran cross-border enterprises based on drugs, bootleg liquor, 
numbers running, and prostitution. They allowed North American viewers to enter 
the seedy bars, brothels, gambling dens, and other illicit spaces that made up the 
underworld, all from the comfort of their own homes. Viewers were also assured 
that, whether on the hunt for Mexican Brown heroin or Canadian Gold whiskey, 
the protagonists of these shows would continue to emerge successful and to foil 
the nefarious intentions of the global criminals working in border cities.
The 1955 Senate Committees: Projecting Consensus at the Federal Level
The consistent outpouring of news stories, magazine articles, television shows, 
and films depicting a growing drug problem had convinced many North Americans 
that something needed to be done to stop it. Within this context, the Canadian and 
American federal governments decided to assess the actual extent of the drug 
problem and how they could eliminate the social evil from their respective nations. 
In 1955, the senates in both countries established special committees designed 
to do just that. As the largest federal investigations into illegal narcotics in the 
postwar years, these massive undertakings were conducted over the course of 
several months and in over fifteen major North American cities—from Montreal 
to Vancouver and New York to Los Angeles. The hearings were well publicized, 
and North Americans could read highlights from the hearings as the venue moved 
from city to city.
 The senate committees purported to take a comprehensive approach to the 
drug problem, one that would help to cut through the escalating public rhetoric, 
which, in the words of one RCMP officer, “favored sensationalism rather than 
accuracy.”31 They heard testimonies from a variety of witnesses on the extent and 
nature of the drug problem, including breakdowns by city, state, and province. 
The senators also reviewed the current law to determine what policies were 
working and what changes needed to be made. Overall, as one Canadian official 
explained, the hearings were designed to provide “sober, factual, and objective 
examinations.” The use of the word sober here is telling. Despite their professed 
“balanced approach,” the committees collected their information in large part from 
legal authorities and federal enforcement officers who were tasked with enforcing 
anti-drug laws and with punishing users and sellers on a daily basis. Rather than 
countering popular rhetoric that framed drug traffickers and addicts as dangerous 
and unwanted outsiders, these supposedly neutral investigations in fact served to 
30 For a brief summary of the show’s episodes, see http://www.episodeworld.com/show/Border_Patrol/
season=all/english/plotguide.
31 Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Special Committee on the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs in Canada (1955), 
p. 20.
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reinforce the perception that upstanding federal officials were needed to fight a 
growing problem across North America.32
 Given the global nature of the drug trade, as well as the extensive media 
coverage of organized crime and transnational smugglers in both countries, it 
is not surprising that the hearings discussed their nations’ borders in detail. The 
senators heard testimonies from a wide variety of individuals about where heroin 
was produced, how it was imported, and who was in charge of these activities. 
Canadian and American law enforcement officials generally agreed on the sources 
of illicit narcotics, which, according to their testimonies, were produced externally 
in Mexico, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and China and trafficked through 
various trade routes, usually through European countries like France and Italy or 
Asian trade routes based in Hong Kong.33 There was some evidence that the main 
sources of heroin had shifted from the Middle East in the early postwar period to 
mainland China by the mid-1950s, in part the result of the opening of global trade 
routes following the war. In the case of marijuana, supplies tended to originate in 
Mexico and were smuggled across the border and, occasionally, up to Canada.34
 While drug networks were expansive and stretched across many different 
countries, federal officials paid particular attention to imports from Communist 
China. Linking these imports to larger sinister political objectives, the committees 
heard a wide range of evidence that China was attempting to sneak heroin into North 
America as a way to destroy its free and prosperous nations from the inside.35 For 
example, in his testimony before the US Senate Committee, Anslinger explained 
that a recent increase in the importation of potent heroin on the west coast, coming 
from Communist China, had already been responsible for the death of several 
users across the country. The Chinese government was purposefully trying to 
harm North American citizens, according to his testimony, and the problem would 
continue to grow over the coming years if the federal government failed to act 
swiftly.36 Senator Daniel’s remarks before the hearings in Texas stated the problem 
more bluntly: “[Drug addiction] is a vicious thing, it is a cancer on our society. We 
have to do something to stop this drug traffic if we want to save our boys and girls 
and communities and country. It is tied into subversion. Red China is pushing this 
heroin here.”37 The image of Chinese Communists threatening the safety of the 
nation’s children fit well with the villain/hero binary because it enabled federal 
officials to frame the fight against drug trafficking as part of a larger moral battle 
between “good guys” and “bad guys,” between harmful outsiders and innocent 
citizens.38 As Senator Daniel asked, “I don’t know of any way that they can destroy 
32 Campbell, Using Women, chap. 5, “Representing the Real”; Schneider, Smack, p. 73; Musto, The American 
Disease, p. 261.
33 Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee, p. 63.
34 United States, Senate Committee, Illicit Narcotics Traffic (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1955-1956), p. 4492.
35 Musto, The American Disease, p. 231.
36 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 43.
37 Ibid., p. 3410.
38 Bernstein, “What Did Apalachin Prove?,” p. 13.
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a country more quietly, more cunningly, than to get thousands of people on heroin, 
do you?”39
 With this emphasis on the moral and political threat posed by external producers 
of the heroin, the senators were especially concerned with the actual process of 
smuggling and how criminals moved this material out of the country of origin and 
into North American markets. According to W. H. Mulligan, Chief Constable of 
Vancouver, traffickers created crafty and effective ways to smuggle drugs across 
both land and sea borders. He stated that the heroin that arrived in Vancouver was 
either transported on vessels from Asia or smuggled up from cities in the eastern 
United States and brought across Canada by “automobiles, trains, planes, and by 
mail.” As he explained, “there are numerous ways, depending on the ingenuity of 
the distributor. Drugs are often sent through the mail in small parcels, in a talcum 
powder tin, or hidden in other types of cosmetics; it may be in rubber containers 
in the gas tank of a car; it may be secreted in the false bottom of a suitcase or 
other type of baggage.”40 Similarly, Commissioner Nicholson of the RCMP 
testified that generally drugs were smuggled into major American port cities, then 
brought north across the US-Canada border. He brought several exhibits to show 
the senators how this was accomplished, including a one kilo tin can, a religious 
book with the inside cut out, a Chinese magazine similarly cut out, and a shoe 
with a hollow heel.41 Significantly, his choices of a religious book and a Chinese 
magazine are telling—they reinforced both the immoral nature of the drug trade 
and the racialized images of Chinese Communists attempting to harm Canadian 
nationals. Further, all of these products could easily be smuggled in automobiles, 
thereby evading detection by even careful border inspectors.
 The ease with which people could smuggle drugs across the US-Canada and 
US-Mexico borders raised the question of how Canadian, American, and Mexican 
officials were working to stem this flow. Senior enforcement officials attempted 
to shed light on this question by explaining the complex web of agencies involved 
in anti-trafficking efforts. Though the enforcement of prohibition policies was 
officially under the purview of the RCMP and the FBN, immigration and customs 
authorities were often considered the first line of defence in narcotics cases. As 
General J. M. Swing, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 
explained to the US Senate Committee, “In performance of their regular duties 
[immigration officers] are called upon to make still watches at known crossing 
points along the international boundary; they must inspect pedestrian traffic, 
automobiles, rail, and air traffic travelling inland from the border—thus, they 
normally come into contact with many persons of questionable character.” Customs 
officials were likewise trained to identify such “questionable characters.”42 A 
39 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 3410.
40 Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee, p. 63.
41 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
42 According to the US Commissioner of Customs, of the 2,508 customs inspectors on duty in 1955, 173 of 
them focused on detailed cases that included narcotics investigations. Further, over 1,200 immigration 
officers were also sworn in as customs officers, which gave them more legal authority to intervene in 
narcotics cases, including the “very broad” search and seizure laws under section 1581 of the US Code 
(United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 148).
717
large portion of American resources and attention went to the Mexican border 
since it was a significant source of drug importation—of both marijuana grown 
in Mexico and heroin smuggled from the East. Yet the United States also had 
officers regularly stationed in Canada who worked closely with Canadian officials 
to reduce illegal smuggling.43 This included a “flying squad” of six plain-clothed 
officers who patrolled the Great Lakes region to detect smugglers. The RCMP also 
had a liaison officer stationed in Washington, DC, who regularly met with “all 
enforcement agencies in the United States,” including meeting frequently with the 
FBN on “joint problems.”44
 Canadian and American federal officials were quick to praise the congenial 
relationship between their respective enforcement officers, promoting their mutual 
dedication to drug prohibition as a sign of close diplomatic ties. This relationship 
was seen as early as the opening day of the hearings, when American senators 
warmly welcomed the chairman of the Canadian Senate Committee and its chief 
counsel. The Canadian senator was asked to provide the first comments before 
the US Senate Committee. He spoke of the significance of the drug problem, the 
common situation facing Canada and the United States and the appreciation he felt 
for being invited to work with the American senators.45 The language of affection 
and close neighbourly ties continued throughout both hearings. For example, in 
his description of the various agencies involved in enforcing narcotics legislation 
in Canada, the head of the RCMP claimed that it “would be discourteous if I did 
not mention as well the close link we have with the US Bureau of Narcotics and 
the great help we get from that agency. We get the very best type of help from that 
Bureau.”46 Similarly, McClellan of the RCMP asserted that “the R.C.M. Police 
have been most fortunate in the quality of the co-operation which we receive from 
the United States Bureau of Narcotics, and in particular, the Agents of that Bureau 
at the border points” throughout Southern Ontario.47
 Several high-level American officials likewise praised the cooperation they 
received from Mexican authorities, arguing that what was once a troubled 
relationship had much improved by the postwar years. As the head of the FBN 
explained, “There was a time when there were gun battles along the border there 
among the smugglers and the enforcement officers....” Thanks to close cooperation, 
this was no longer the case. Indeed, Anslinger criticized newspapers in American 
border states for blaming the drug problem on Mexican officials, arguing instead 
that they deserved praise for their ability to reduce drug-related crime over the 
course of the previous decade.48 Similarly, the US Commissioner of Customs 
described the cooperation his agency received from Mexico as “excellent.” “I 
was tremendously impressed,” he said, “with the relations between our customs 
men, our forces there, and the Mexico police authorities.... Our reports from 
Mexico City are very voluminous and very wonderful, in my opinion. I think 
43 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 129.
44 Ibid., p. 107.
45 Ibid., p. 2.
46 Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee, p. 21.
47 Ibid., p. 314.
48 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 106.
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that is probably our best ... representation abroad.” Indeed, the highest officials 
in Mexico, including the Minister of Health, the Attorney General, and President 
Ruiz Cortines all publicly supported enforcement efforts, and it was “because of 
their support that [the FBN was] able to get some of the big gangsters....”49
 To demonstrate a united front, senior enforcement officials provided numerous 
examples of specific cases in which cross-border interaction had facilitated drug-
related busts and arrests of smugglers operating across the American, Canadian, 
and Mexican borders. One case was that of George Mallock, described by 
American customs officials as “a very bad egg.” He and his brother John Mallock 
had been key players in the drug trafficking business in Canada in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. George was eventually arrested for a drug offence in Vancouver, 
but he skipped bail and hid from authorities for three years. In 1955, he decided 
to cross the US-Canada border and head for Mexico to avoid the warrant out 
for his arrest. American and Mexican authorities were alerted to his whereabouts 
and eventually found him in Mexico City. There, Mexican officials arrested 
George and extradited him to Canada, where he was sentenced to 27.5 years in a 
Canadian prison. His brother John was not so lucky and was killed by the Mexican 
authorities while trying to escape.50
 One of the most impressive examples of inter-agency cooperation led to the 
arrest of Antoine D’Agostino, “considered by international law enforcement 
authorities as one of the most important international narcotics violators.” In 
1937, D’Agostino moved from his native Bone, Algeria, to Marseilles, France, 
where he began working with a group of notorious Corsican criminals who 
specialized in narcotics, international jewellery robberies, counterfeiting, and gold 
smuggling. In 1948, he fled his death penalty conviction in Toulouse (after being 
charged with treason for supplying French troops with heroin during the war) and 
subsequently began a large smuggling network out of Montreal, Quebec. Once 
busted by Canadian authorities, D’Agostino left Canada and headed for New York 
City, where he joined another gang of Corsicans. After the FBN cracked down on 
this smuggling network, D’Agostino went underground. Though his whereabouts 
were unknown between 1951 and 1953, he re-surfaced in Mexico City, where he 
was arrested on March 7, 1955, and sent back to New York City to face narcotics 
charges. Canada likewise filed extradition charges to bring D’Agostino back to 
Montreal, after which the French government indicated that they would extradite 
him for execution upon termination of the charges in the United States and Canada. 
In what was a truly international effort, federal authorities working in Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico were able to track down this notorious and dangerous 
drug trafficker and subsequently bring him to justice.51
 Much like the media narratives and pop culture representations of cross-border 
drug smuggling, the testimonies of federal officials served the dual purpose of 
delineating particular images of dangerous drug smugglers and presenting federal 
enforcement officers as the heroes needed to fight them. Federal officials discussed 
49 Ibid., p. 108.
50 Ibid., pp. 707-708.
51 Ibid., p. 81.
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the problem of organized syndicates and Communist subversion, framing anti-
trafficking efforts as a struggle between nefarious outsiders and upstanding 
enforcement officers. The highly public hearings of the senate committees 
provided an ideal platform for federal officials to promote their prohibitionist 
agendas and to boast about their successful sophisticated tactics.52 For agencies 
whose operating budgets depended on both a perceived need for their services and 
a positive success rate, projecting images of cross-border cooperation and success 
was clearly important. Indeed, aligning itself with the political objectives of the 
Cold War enabled the FBN to increase its operating budget from $1.6 million in 
1950 to $4 million in 1959.53 The public senate committee hearings played no 
small role in helping such agencies build their political capital.
 Officials’ testimonies before the committees, though, also had broader 
implications for definitions of citizenship in the postwar years. By perpetuating 
images of heroes and villains along the border, American and Canadian officials 
were engaging in a discourse of state-making that drew a line between acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour and between desirable and undesirable community 
members. Situating these lines within a prohibitionist framework, which 
emphasized criminalization over treatment, federal agents reinforced racialized 
images of dangerous outsiders and vulnerable citizens to solidify their agencies’ 
importance within the global struggle against Communism. By recounting the 
successful arrests of smugglers like George Mallock and Antoine D’Agostino, 
federal enforcement officers also provided tangible evidence that a prohibitionist 
agenda could in fact be shared by the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In this 
way, federal enforcement officers presented their mission not only as stopping the 
spread of drug trafficking and addiction, but also as facilitating close diplomatic 
ties with their neighbours, whom they saw as integral to their ability to be 
successful in their fight against the global drug trade. As their testimonies made 
clear, the fight against drugs was truly a global one, and therefore winning the war 
would ultimately depend on the ability of Canada and the United States to protect 
their boundaries and maintain authority in the fluid spaces of the borderlands.
The Villain/Hero Binary and the Realities of Policing on the Border
While stories of federal agents taking down key members of the underworld made 
for good publicity and helped project a positive image of federal enforcement 
agencies at the senate investigations, they often failed to reflect the daily experiences 
of many officials tasked with enforcing the national line. Often the image of 
cross-border cooperation and consensus was undermined by the testimonies of 
law enforcement officers working on the ground in border cities. Ironically, the 
very villain/hero binary embedded in anti-drug rhetoric facilitated this divide 
between federal objectives and local approaches. Expressing frustration with the 
wide-open nature of border cities and a perceived lack of cooperation coming 
from the governments across the line, local officers sometimes offered testimonies 
that proved damaging to federal diplomatic objectives. The rhetoric of prohibition 
52 Hernandez, Migra, p. 211.
53 Meier, The Politics of Sin, p. 41.
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highlighted an inherent problem: it was tricky to cultivate a close relationship with 
neighbouring nations while framing one’s domestic drug problem as an import 
from dangerous outsiders.
 One of the most blatant divides between the testimonies of senior federal 
officials and those of officers working on the ground was the language they used to 
describe the law-breakers with whom they came into contact. The representations 
of transnational smugglers, in which the media and federal officials afforded 
the high-level traffickers some degree of agency, stood in stark contrast to the 
images of demoralized addicts, peddlers, and prostitutes with whom lower-level 
officers dealt on a regular basis. Rather than portraying drug users and dealers as 
“sophisticated” and “cunning” criminals, local police officers, border patrol agents, 
and immigration officials defined them as pathetic individuals who inhabited the 
lowest levels of society. As the Commissioner Nicholson of the RCMP vividly 
described, “From the standpoint of the police who see them day to day, they are a 
dreary lot of parasites supporting themselves ... by crime and prostitution.... They 
are in truth the dregs of society.”54 Another RCMP officer similarly explained 
that drug peddlers “contribute nothing to society” but instead “prey on society in 
conditions of degradation, filth, and depravity.”55
 These morally bankrupt individuals were right at home in bordertowns, which, 
according to local law enforcement agents, attracted the lowest type of criminals. 
This was especially true, they testified, in the rough-and-tumble cities along 
the US-Mexico border. In the hearings held in Texas and southern California, 
border patrol officers, immigration inspectors, and local law enforcement officers 
described the situation in cities like Juarez and Tijuana, emphasizing the ease 
with which even the most novice tourist could find any type of illicit goods or 
services he or she desired. In his discussion of Juarez, a local news reporter stated 
that one need only head over to the “slum” area known as the Bellavista District, 
which was home to over fifteen establishments where one could purchase heroin. 
The reporter’s discussion of these “slum” areas was reinforced by photographs of 
city streets where Americans could easily locate heroin dealers and prostitutes. 
Two photos (Figures 1 and 2) show the Banos Jordan, a bathhouse run by “La 
Nacha,” (“the queen of the border”), a notorious trafficker and madam who 
had been operating out of Juarez since the 1920s.56 These pictures, which were 
accompanied by fifteen mug shots of Mexican and Chinese smugglers who 
operated out of the region (see the examples in Figure 3), helped to solidify racial 
connections between the traffickers on the Mexican border and the illicit spaces 
in which they operated.57 From the grungy streets of the Bellavista District to 
the bustling nightlife in Tijuana, local enforcement officers recounted stories of 
the lurid vice districts and illicit businesses booming in the border region. In the 
54 Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee, p. 28.
55 Ibid., p. 316.
56 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, pp. 648, 657.
57 Ibid., p. 3305.
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Figures 1 and 2: Banos Jordan and house of “La Nacha,” Juarez, Mexico. Source: United States 
Senate Committee, Illicit Narcotics Traffic (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1955-1956), pp. 648, 657.
words of one Texas law enforcement agent, “No question you can get [heroin] 
down there if you have the money; or marijuana either.”58
 Notions of racial and cultural difference often led American enforcement 
officers on the ground to criticize the way in which Mexican authorities handled 
the drug issue. Bernard McLeaish, a customs agent working out of Brownsville, 
Texas, explicitly framed his experiences along the border in the language of “us 
versus them,” testifying that Mexicans were culturally much more tolerant of vice 
than Americans. As he explained to the committee, “If you stay on the Mexican 
border for any length of time you will understand the Mexican philosophy is quite 
different from ours. What is immoral to us in the United States is not immoral 
to them in Mexico.” This was true, McLeaish asserted, of both the Mexican 
58 Ibid., p. 2380. 
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people and Mexican authorities.59 Further, in wider public discussions, American 
authorities called heroin originating in Mexico “Mexican Brown heroin,” likewise 
creating an implicit connection between the production of the illegal substance 
and a perception of racial difference with their southern neighbours. The term 
“Mexican Brown heroin” angered Mexican authorities so much that they appealed 
to the United Nations to ban members from using the term at the agency’s 
meetings. The UN Council agreed that this placed an unfair stigma on Mexico and 
concluded that member countries should recognize the term as both unjustified 
and inaccurate.60
 American senators found themselves walking a fine line between soliciting 
feedback from local officers working on the ground and being careful not to cause 
further damage to the relationship between American and Mexican authorities. 
Indeed, the senators seemed keenly aware that any suggestion of racial or cultural 
differences between Mexicans and Americans before the US Senate Committee 
risked straining diplomatic tensions between the two nations. This is precisely 
what occurred after the testimony of Walter Naylor, the Chief Narcotics Division 
Officer for the Department of Public Safety in Texas. Naylor had blamed much of 
the drug problem on Mexican traffickers and on Mexican authorities from whom 
he received very little cooperation. He described the ease with which anyone 
could purchase drugs in Mexican border towns and the willingness of Mexican 
authorities to turn a blind eye. This problem went all the way up the chain of 
command, according to Naylor. He described one instance when high-ranking 
Mexican officials had backed out of a meeting to address this issue and refused 
to reschedule. In a condescending tone, Naylor claimed, “We thought we might 
be able to assist the Mexican Government in their problems, if they do have a 
problem, and we think they do. I offered the Mexican consul the use of my men 
to use as undercover agent ... [but w]e haven’t heard any more [from them].”61 
59 Ibid., p. 2818.
60 Ibid., pp. 314-315.
61 Ibid., p. 2383.
Figure 3: Several of the mug shots of Mexican and Chinese smugglers that appeared in the  
US Senate Committe report. Source: Illicit Narcotics Traffic, pp. 2932, 3305.
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When Senator Daniel asked Naylor what he thought of the Mexican officials, and 
whether he received any cooperation from them, Naylor flatly responded, “No, 
sir.”62
 Much to the US Senate Committee’s frustration, Naylor’s testimony sparked 
outrage on the part of Mexican officials and left the American senators doing 
damage control.63 Senator Daniel brought Naylor back to testify so that he would 
have a chance to explain the evidence he used in making his accusations about 
Mexican authorities. While Naylor mainly stood by his original assertions (citing 
newspaper reports as his evidence that 90 per cent of the heroin in Texas came 
from Mexico), Senator Daniel emphatically tried to insist that the goal was not 
to offend Mexican officials, whom they considered to be great allies in the fight 
against trafficking. Yet, beneath even such conciliatory words, Daniel also struck 
a tone that blamed this misunderstanding on Mexican authorities, who had been 
invited to sit in on the hearings in Texas but had declined. “Had they been there,” 
he said, “... I am sure they would have known that every time anything was said 
about Mexico, about 10 times as much was said about our own citizens and our 
own people and our own laws. We have a mutual problem on the border.”64 “I wish 
they had done like Canada and like the Mexican officials in Los Angeles, and be 
present and here....”65
 Senator Daniel’s lamentation that Mexican authorities had declined an 
invitation to participate in the Texas hearings reflected a larger trend in which 
American and Canadian authorities used their relationship as the example of 
sophisticated cross-border ties that Mexican authorities should work to emulate. 
Anslinger, for example, paternalistically suggested in his opening remarks before 
the US Senate Committee that “those men who are down there on the firing line” 
along the US-Mexico border get together for informal meetings similar to those 
held by officials working along the US-Canada border. He openly contrasted the 
violent and unpredictable nature of the southern border with the peacefulness and 
orderliness of the northern border, suggesting that the Mexican authorities could 
learn much by emulating the cooperation provided by the Canadian officials.66 
There was no suggestion of racial, ethnic, or cultural differences between 
Americans and Canadians. Instead, the world’s “longest undefended border” was 
once again upheld as the example of how modern states should interact with their 
neighbours and how they could work together to defend their mutual interests.
 Yet a close examination of the testimonies of local enforcement officers 
working along the US-Canada border likewise suggests that they too were often 
frustrated with the situation with which they had to deal on a daily basis in 
northern border cities. Ironically, while Mexican officials were concerned with the 
overemphasis Americans placed on Mexico as the source of their drug problem, 
62 Ibid., p. 2382.
63 For example, in response to a series of newspaper articles published across Texas, Mexico’s Attorney 
General asked Foreign Minister Louis Padello to protest what he called “defamatory articles appearing in 
San Antonio and Houston” (United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 3318).
64 United States, Illicit Narcotics Traffic, p. 3784.
65 Ibid., p. 3318.
66 Ibid., p. 107.
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Canadian authorities expressed frustration that they received too little attention 
from their American counterparts. Indeed, American officials spent considerably 
less time trying to assess the problems along the northern border. Although they 
interviewed both enforcement agents and former users about their experiences 
with smuggling along the US-Canada border, the senators did not pursue the 
issue with nearly as much zeal as they did when interviewing users along the 
southern border.67 There were no accompanying photographs or maps of Canadian 
border towns, nor did the issue of cross-border smuggling in cities like Detroit and 
Buffalo dominate the investigations as it did in cities like El Paso and San Diego.
 The tendency of American authorities to downplay the cross-border issue along 
their northern border frustrated Canadian authorities. After all, the United States 
was Canada’s main source of heroin and marijuana in the postwar years, much as 
Mexico was a key supplier for the American drug market. In his testimony before 
the Canadian Senate Committee, George McClellan, Commander of the Ontario 
division of the RCMP, expressed the frustrating and, at times, hopeless situation 
local law enforcement agents faced when trying to curtail cross-border vice in cities 
like Windsor, Hamilton, and Toronto. Their proximity to major American cities 
and the long “undefended” border between the countries were central enforcement 
challenges for local agents. As McClellan explained, “there is a heavy flow of 
international traffic in both directions, by rail, air, and automobile. This ... free 
flow of traffic in accordance with the mutual trust and understanding between the 
two countries ... poses many problems for both Canadian and US Immigration and 
Customs Officials....”68 McClellan said that it would be completely impossible 
“to establish any rigid system of checking traffic without completely tying up the 
free movement of people and goods essential to our international commerce and 
tourist trade.” For McClellan, this heavy traffic, combined with the fact that “most 
affluent elements of the criminal underworld on the United States side reside 
in areas easily accessible to the Ontario and Quebec borders,” made smuggling 
relatively easy for traffickers and made regulation extremely difficult for Canadian 
officials.69 In his estimation, then, the mutual trust and close relationship between 
the United States and Canada actually made it easier for smugglers to sneak 
through the national line.
 The veiled frustrations expressed by Canadian authorities like McClellan to 
the 1955 committees had erupted explicitly five years earlier, when the Kefauver 
Committee passed through the city of Detroit. In many ways a precursor to the 
expansive 1955 investigations, the Kefauver Committee’s hearings in Detroit 
were well publicized across Canada and raised concerns about the relationship 
between organized crime across the US-Canada divide. Tensions between 
American and Canadian officials arose in November of 1950, when a Canadian 
newspaper printed a story titled “Windsor Wire Service: Predict US Senate Will 
Rap Ontario.” The article claimed that the US Senate was going to reprimand the 
Ontario government’s response to vice activities and suggested that the US Senate 
67 Ibid., pp. 75, 107, 150, 216, 1593, 2138, 2134, 4519, 4290.
68 Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee, p. 313.
69 Ibid., p. 312.
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would take a strong-armed approach to dealing with their Canadian neighbours. 
This had broader implications for illegal industries in the region, it asserted, since 
“the same people who are involved in the gambling rackets are mixed up with 
narcotics and prostitution....” According to the article, “speculation by police 
officials here is that the Ontario Provincial Government [OPP] will receive a 
severe condemnation by the US Senate” and would be expected to take strong 
action to “clean up Windsor.”70
 Premier of Ontario Leslie M. Frost considered this to be a diplomatic affront 
and quickly contacted Kefauver to prevent a public lashing by the US Senate. Frost 
took this one step further, though, and used it as an opportunity to suggest that in 
fact American authorities had failed to do their duty to prevent cross-border vice 
and smuggling. In a letter sent to Kefauver on November 23, 1950, Frost defended 
the work of Canadian agents, blasted the lack of cooperation from American 
officials, and suggested further meetings between Canadian and American police 
forces to deal with the problem. After providing a detailed account of the approach 
taken by Ontario officials over the last couple of years, which involved authorities 
at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels, Frost asserted that “the problem is 
international in nature.... May I draw your attention to the fact that the problems in 
regard to gambling and vice which we have in the Province of Ontario have their 
origin in the United States in nearly all cases. Our Forces here cannot effectively 
deal with the problem without the cooperation of the United States law enforcement 
agencies.” According to the premier, if the Detroit side would give the Windsor 
police as much cooperation as the OPP gave their American counterparts, vice in 
Windsor, which was “difficult if not impossible to cope with,” could be very much 
curtailed. Frost closed his letter by inviting Kefauver to visit the Canadian side of 
the border next time he was in the area, since it would “be a pleasure to meet him” 
and “to know we would get some real action.”71
 Though nothing serious came of this exchange—the Kefauver Committee 
did not publicly “rap” Ontario enforcement officials, and Frost and Kefauver 
ended their correspondence on civil terms—it does provide some insight into the 
frustrations that occurred between American and Canadian authorities tasked with 
regulating vice in cities near the national line. Though Canadian and American 
authorities shared similar goals and both recognized the importance of effectively 
policing the national border between them, each side had different priorities. 
Authorities in the booming metropolis of Detroit were primarily concerned with 
the ways in which drugs were brought into their city from other large American 
cities like New York and Chicago, as well as cities along the southern border. In 
contrast, Ontario officials were keenly aware of their position along the national 
line, in that American-run syndicates often enabled narcotics and other vice 
operations to flourish in adjacent Canadian cities. As the correspondence between 
Frost and Kefauver suggests, Canadian officials often felt they had little chance of 
curtailing vice in their own cities without the help of their neighbours to the south, 
70 “Windsor Wire Service: Predict U.S. Senate will Rap Ontario,” Globe and Mail, November 23, 1950, p. 3.
71 Archives of Ontario, RG 3-23, Box 213, Windsor Police Commission, File 313 G, B292181, Letter from 
Frost to Kefauver, November 23, 1959.
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and this cooperation was not nearly as extensive as Canadians officials would 
have liked.
 The diplomatic ruptures that occurred between Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico suggest that, despite lofty rhetoric on the part of federal officials, a cohesive 
prohibitionist agenda was extremely difficult to enact along the borders running 
across North America. The tendency to blame the drug problem on “others,” 
so prevalent in the hero/villain binary—be they racial and ethnic outsiders, lax 
Mexican authorities, or American criminals—profoundly shaped the perspectives 
of local officers working in border cities. Dealing daily with the permeability of 
the border, these officers rarely spoke of a comprehensive cross-border strategy in 
the fight against transnational crime. Instead, officers working to try to stamp out 
illicit, cross-border crime were keenly aware of the inefficiencies in cross-border 
policing tactics that made their jobs difficult. Unlike the fictional characters of 
Eliot Ness or George Morton, who always “got their man,” local officers often felt 
overwhelmed by their task of stopping smugglers across the high-volume border 
crossing points. As a result, prohibition policies were much more difficult to enact 
than federal officials let on, and inter-agency cooperation was often undermined 
by local officers’ tendencies to blame the drug problem on the lax efforts of 
seemingly lazy enforcement officers on the other side of the national line.
Conclusion
As the 1955 committees drew to a close, the senators put forward a series of 
recommendations on how best to address the drug problems in their respective 
nations. These recommendations ultimately reflected the committees’ dedication 
to a prohibitionist ideology that defined illegal narcotic use as immoral and drug 
users themselves as undesirable citizens. In the end, they both recommended 
increased policing, harsher sentences, and other punitive measures such as 
aggressive enforcement of drug-related crimes like theft and prostitution.72 The 
US Senate Committee’s recommendations were implemented the following year, 
in the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, which raised the minimum sentence on 
some drug offences to five years and allowed a jury to impose the death penalty 
on anyone over the age of eighteen convicted of trafficking heroin to minors.73 
Likewise, the Canadian Senate Committee’s recommendations were implemented 
in the 1961 Narcotic Control Act, which increased the maximum penalty for 
trafficking, possession for the purposes of trafficking, and importing and exporting 
from fourteen years to life. The Canadian law also enacted a mandatory minimum 
sentence of seven years for importing and exporting, making it the third highest 
minimum sentence requirement, behind only murder and treason.74 By the end of 
the postwar period, blaming social ills on unwanted outsiders clearly had very real 
effects on men and women involved in the drug trade. Now subject to the harshest 
72 Robert R. Solomon and Melvyn Green, “The First Century: The History of Non-medical Opiate Use and 
Control Policies in Canada, 1870-1970” in Judith C. Blackwell and Patricia G. Erickson, eds., Illicit Drugs 
in Canada: A Risky Business (Scarborough, ON: Nelson, 1988), p. 104.
73 Musto, The American Disease, p. 231.
74 Solomon and Green, “The First Century,” p. 105.
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penalties enacted to date in either country, traffickers ultimately bore the brunt of 
the blame for North America’s drug problem.
 Public debates played a crucial role in creating a climate in which these 
decidedly harsh penalties could be enacted at the federal level. Indeed, throughout 
the late 1940s and 1950s, news stories, pop culture representations, and well-
publicized federal hearings had effectively created links between transnational 
drug trafficking, racial minorities, and Communist subversion. Working within 
a Cold War moral framework, these disparate groups established the hero/villain 
binary, which perpetuated the notion that North Americans were increasingly 
susceptible to the dangerous wiles of unwanted outsiders. By constantly depicting 
violent confrontations between drug traffickers and law enforcement officers, these 
deeply racialized images likewise affirmed the notion that a strong enforcement 
presence was needed along the national line. Drug traffickers, mafia bosses, and 
Communist agents had to be stopped at the border, and federal officers were just 
the ones to take on this job.
 Since protecting the nation was a central goal in these moral narratives, border 
cities became key battlegrounds in the war against vice and crime. Cities as disparate 
as Vancouver, Windsor, Buffalo, Juarez, and Tijuana all shared one common feature 
in postwar public debates: they were portrayed as spaces particularly susceptible 
to corruption and crime due to their positions near the national line. While we 
have become accustomed to viewing the US-Canada and US-Mexico borderlands 
as significantly different spaces, postwar rhetoric about cross-border trafficking 
demonstrates that important similarities united North Americans’ perceptions of 
cities along both borders. Emerging at a time when North Americans were both 
travelling across the borders at an unprecedented level and increasingly fearful of 
subversion from the outside, bordertowns came to represent spaces of adventure 
and danger, intrigue and fear. The profound tension between celebrating mobility 
and fearing the unwanted, polluting possibilities of cross-border interaction was 
at the heart of postwar border rhetoric. In this way, contemporary perceptions of 
bordertowns as “wide open” were shaped in important ways by Cold War moral 
politics and debates over the nature of citizenship in what many North Americans 
saw as an increasingly global world.
 Finally, though the emphasis on traffickers as dangerous criminals enabled 
federal officers to push for stricter enforcement policies that would bolster the 
political importance of their respective agencies, the very success of the villain/
hero binary sometimes worked against their larger diplomatic objectives. An 
examination of the testimonies of local law enforcement agents before the 1955 
senate committees highlights the contradictions inherent in trying to pin the drug 
problem on racial, ethnic, and political others, while trying to maintain close 
diplomatic ties with neighbouring nations. When Texas officers blamed the “wide 
open” nature of southern bordertowns on the supposed moral weaknesses of 
their Mexican neighbours, they made it much more difficult for federal officials 
to project a united front in the struggle against crime on the southern border. 
Likewise, though American and Canadian authorities often touted the bonds of 
friendship and shared cultural values that enabled enforcement officers to work 
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together across the northern border, Canadian officials were also often frustrated 
by the lack of attention they received from their neighbours to the south. In these 
moments, the rhetoric of cross-border friendship and cooperation clearly did not 
match the reality of enforcing prohibition policies in local border communities. 
The very fact that illegal drug trafficking continued across the US-Mexico and 
US-Canada borders despite these prohibition policies, and would actually grow 
substantially in the following decade, suggests that we need to be sceptical of 
federal proclamations about the effectiveness of anti-drug policies in the postwar 
era. Their inability to police the long borders that connected Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico demonstrates the resilience of illicit economies and their 
ability to adapt to local environments—especially in the bordertowns that brought 
North Americans together in the postwar years.
